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Four decades of forensic research have left unanswered a fundamental issue regarding the
best conceptualization of competency to stand trial vis-à-vis the Dusky standard. The cur-
rent study investigated three competing models (discrete abilities, domains, and cognitive
complexity) on combined data (N = 411) from six forensic and correctional samples. Using
the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised (ECST-R), items representative of the
Dusky prongs were used to test the three models via maximum-likelihood confirmatory fac-
tor analyses (CFA). Of the three, only the discrete abilities model evidenced a good fit, indi-
cating that competency to stand trial should consider separately each defendant’s factual
understanding of the proceedings, rational understanding of the proceedings, and ability to
consult with counsel. ECST-R competency scales, based on the current CFA, have excellent
alphas (.83 to .89) and interrater reliabilities (.97 to .98).
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A major challenge for competency evaluations is the
systematic appraisal of the legal criteria as articulated in
Dusky v. United States (1960; hereinafter Dusky). This in-
troduction begins with an examination of the Dusky stan-
dard and discusses several models for operationalizing its
relevant criteria. Next, competency measures are evalu-
ated regarding their abilities to establish dimensions con-
gruent with Dusky. Finally, the current research is
introduced as a study to test competing models via
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
Psychologists are increasingly involved in the forensic 
assessment of criminal and civil issues. Beyond their clini-
cal expertise, psychologists constitute a driving force in 
the development of specialized, psychometrically sound 
measures to address psycholegal issues. Within the crimi-
nal domain, referrals for competency to stand trial pre-
dominate with estimates between 50,000 (Skeem, 
Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998) and 60,000 (Bonnie & 
Grisso, 2000) evaluations annually. Despite this predomi-
nance, more than half of clinicians specializing in forensic 
practice either rarely (< 10%) or never use competency 
measures (Borum & Grisso, 1995).
Dusky Standard
In 1960, the Supreme Court articulated the legal stan-
dard for competency to stand trial in the landmark Dusky
decision. Encapsulated in a single sentence, Dusky delin-
eated the legal criteria: “The test must be whether he has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding—and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him” (p. 789). In subsequent
cases (e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 1996; Pate v. Robinson,
1966; Riggins v. Nevada, 1992), the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the Dusky standard and even extended
its application to pro se cases in which defendants act as
their own counsel (Godinez v. Moran, 1993). Whereas the
American Bar Association (1989) argued that Drope v.
Missouri (1975) broadened competency to contain the
encompassing phrase “otherwise assist in [their] defense”
(p. 170), this conclusion seems unwarranted. Despite a
passing remark, “assist in preparing his defense,” the court
explicitly embraced the Dusky standard. In summary, the
Dusky standard has provided the constitutionally
necessary criteria for competency to stand trial for more
than four decades (Grisso, 2003).
Models for competency to stand trial can be conceptu-
alized as extrapolated or explicit models. Extrapolated
models go beyond the legal criteria delineated by the
Dusky standard to provide inferences about what might be
or should be included in competency decisions. In con-
trast, explicit models attempt to operationalize the Dusky
standard.
As an influential proponent of an extrapolated model,
Bonnie (1992, 1993) theorized that competency should be
divided into two domains, foundational competency and
decisional competency, with elaborate hypotheses about
the abilities needed for each prong. As a further example,
Miller (2003) goes beyond the strict criteria of Dusky to
hypothesize about volitional abilities that are defined very
broadly as “the capacity to utilize information appropri-
ately in one’s own defense and to function effectively in
the legal environment” (p. 187). Finally, Abrams (2002)
speculated that the ability to communicate was a funda-
mental component of competency to stand trial. Presum-
ably, such communications extend beyond the defense
counsel to such matters as the ability to provide persuasive
testimony. The strength of these extrapolated models is
that they stimulate debate and even research on compe-
tency to stand trial. The obvious limitation is their extrale-
gal nature, which differs fundamentally from the Dusky
requirements of forensic practice.
Rogers (2001) summarized three explicit models of
competency to stand trial based on the Dusky standard.
These competing models are outlined as follows:
• The discrete-abilities model operationalizes each
component of Dusky: (a) rational ability to consult,
(b) factual understanding of the proceedings, and (c)
rational understanding of the proceedings. Clinical
researchers (e.g., Grisso, 2003; Otto et al., 1998;
Rogers, Grandjean, Tillbrook, Vitacco, & Sewell,
2001) typically subscribe to this model. Its primary
advantage is its degree of specification in
delineating separate components.
• The domains model capitalizes on the Dusky sen-
tence structure. Syntactically, this categorization is
based on the hyphenation between (a) rational abil-
ity to consult and (b) factual and rational under-
standing of the proceedings. This model is favored
by some legal scholars (e.g., Melton, Petrila,
Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997; Shuman, 1996). Its
primary advantage is its division of competency into
two related domains.
• The cognitive-complexity model distinguishes two
components based on the necessary level of cogni-
tive abilities: (a) factual understanding and (b) ratio-
nal abilities. Factual understanding generally
involves the simple recall of overlearned material. In
contrast, rational abilities often require complex
cognitive processes that involve analyses, integra-
tion of data, and complicated decisions (see, e.g.,
Bonnie, 1992). In addition, factual understanding
appears less vulnerable to the effects of severe
psychopathology. Its primary advantage is its con-
ceptual elegance in appreciating the differing cogni-
tive capacities required by the Dusky standard.
Despite more than three decades of research on compe-
tency measures, investigators have not systematically
evaluated the usefulness of these explicit models in
operationalizing the Dusky criteria. The next section selec-
tively examines competency measures, with a focus on un-
derlying dimensions and their congruence with the Dusky
standard.
Competency Measures
Following Robey’s (1965) seminal checklist, the first
generation of formal competency measures emerged in the
1970s. Under the aegis of National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH), the first two measures were produced, the
Competency Assessment Instrument (CAI) (Lipsitt,
Lelos, & McGarry, 1971) and Competency Screening Test
(CST) (McGarry, 1973). The CAI was designed to mea-
sure 13 functions related to competency to stand trial. Al-
though its functions appear to be related to the Dusky
prongs, Grisso’s (2003) recent review did not include any
factor-analytic research. Moreover, the CST was formu-
lated to address abilities that are not directly parallel to the
Dusky prongs (see Grisso, 2003). Efforts to establish sta-
in prototypicality. Mean prototypical ratings were 5.70 for
factual understanding, 6.36 for rational understanding,
and 6.04 for rational ability to consult. Rogers et al. (2001)
conducted a PAF on ECST-R items and subitems, which
resulted in a two-factor solution that corresponded to the
cognitive-complexity model of Dusky.
In summary, more than three decades of research on
competency measures has yielded surprisingly few posi-
tive findings regarding their underlying dimensions and
correspondence to Dusky. In general, solutions appear to
be unstable and incongruent with the Dusky prongs.
Equally concerning, confirmatory factor analyses have
produced consistently poor model fits, irrespective of the
particular measure or the Dusky model.
Current Investigation
One advantage of the ECST-R over other competency
measures is its use of prototypical analysis to select items
that are strongly representative of the Dusky prongs. This
feature minimizes the inclusion of irrelevant variables that
may obscure our evaluation of the Dusky models. With
prototypical items, we are able to test via CFA the three
competing models: discrete abilities, domains, and cogni-
tive complexity. CFA is especially useful in testing the a
priori models of latent variable structure, as found with
Dusky alternatives. For the optimal Dusky model, we de-
veloped scales based on the ECST-R factors and tested
their scale homogeneity and interrater reliability.
METHOD
Samples
The current study uses an amalgamation of ECST-R
samples to ensure a broad representation of competency
referrals, mentally disordered offenders awaiting trial, and
potential feigners. For this purpose, the study utilizes the
two earlier samples reported in Rogers et al. (2001), that is,
Tillbrook’s (2000) competency cases and Rogers and
Grandjean’s (2000) mentally disordered offenders. We
augmented these data from a feigning study of the ECST-R
that includes three samples: inpatients in a competency
restoration program, jail detainees under standard instruc-
tions, and jail detainees feigning incompetency to stand
trial. Finally, we included an additional competency refer-
ral sample. These six samples are summarized below:
Competency cases. The Tillbrook (2000) sample of
competency cases (n = 70) was drawn from court referrals
in Alabama and inpatient competency cases from maxi-
mum security hospitals in Alabama and Florida. With a
ble solutions for the CST have proved unsuccessful; six-
factor (Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Harvard 
Medical School, 1973), three-factor (Bagby, Nicholson, 
Rogers, & Nussbaum, 1992) and two-factor (Ustad, Rog-
ers, Sewell, & Guarnaccia, 1996) solutions are not stable 
and do not correspond to the Dusky standard.
The Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT), origi-
nally developed by Wildman et al. (1980), has been sub-
jected to extensive factor-analytic work. Originally 
conceptualized as two factors, a three-factor model was 
tested and further supported via congruence analysis 
(Bagby et al., 1992). Later attempts to confirm this factor 
solution via CFA proved unsuccessful, which may be par-
tially the result of the divergence of samples—competency-
restoration sample (Ustad et al., 1996) and mentally disor-
dered offenders (Rogers, Ustad, Sewell, & Reinhart, 
1996). Because of the GCCT’s item coverage, Dusky’s 
consult-with-counsel prong is poorly represented in all the 
factor solutions.
Second-generation competency measures began with 
the commercial publication of the MacArthur Competency 
Assessment Tool–Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA)
(Poythress et al., 1999). Originally designed as a research 
measure to test Bonnie’s extrapolated theory of compe-
tency (Bonnie et al., 1997), the MacCAT-CA was subse-
quently revamped and published as a competency tool. Its 
extensive use of hypothetical case information appears 
discrepant with the Dusky requirements that focus specifi-
cally on the defendant’s own pending case. Regarding di-
mensions of competency, the test manual neglected to 
report whether the MacCAT-CA scales1 are measuring dis-
tinct constructs via intercorrelations or factor analysis 
(Grisso, 2003, p. 98). A principal-axis factoring (PAF) 
by Rogers et al. (2001) found some support for a three-
dimension model with variable correspondence to the 
Dusky prongs. The MacCAT-CA’s strength is the rational-
understanding prong (i.e., the Appreciation scale), which 
appears to represent one strong dimension. In contrast, the 
consult-with-counsel prong (i.e., the Reasoning scale) 
does not appear to be unidimensional; only five of eight 
designated items load on this dimension, which also in-
cludes several nondesignated items. Although moderately 
promising, these results must be rigorously evaluated via 
CFA before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
The current investigation focuses on the Evaluation of 
Competency to Stand Trial–Revised (ECST-R) (Rogers, 
Tillbrook, & Sewell, 1998) that was explicitly designed to 
address competency evaluations via the Dusky standard. 
In the development of the ECST-R, five recognized ex-
perts on competency to stand trial provided prototypical 
ratings of clinically relevant constructs (Rogers, 2001). 
On a 7-point rating scale, constructs were only retained if 
their average ratings were at least moderately high (> 5.00)
mean age of 35.50 (SD = 11.84), this male sample was pri-
marily African American (65.7%) with fewer European
Americans (32.8%).
Mentally disordered offenders. The Rogers and
Grandjean (2000) sample (n = 100) was mentally disor-
dered offenders on a jail treatment unit. With a mean age of
34.7 (SD = 8.81), this male sample was predominantly Eu-
ropean Americans (67.0%) with smaller representations
of African Americans (23.0%) and Hispanic Americans
(4.0%).
Competency restoration. This sample (n = 56) was
composed of defendants in a competency restoration pro-
gram at North Texas State Hospital in Vernon, Texas. Con-
sisting predominantly of males (82.1%) with a mean age
of 37.29 (SD = 12.04), its ethnic composition was mostly
African American (44.6%), European American (35.7%),
and Hispanic American (19.6%).
Feigning incompetency. This sample (n = 52) was re-
cruited from a Texas jail as part of a simulation study of the
ECST-R. The individuals were instructed to feign incom-
petency with monetary incentives. The sample had
slightly more females (51.9%) with an average age of
29.75 years (SD = 7.19). Regarding ethnic representation,
the sample was primarily European American (69.2%)
with smaller percentages of African American (19.2%)
and Hispanic American (3.8%).
Jail detainee. This sample (n = 44) was recruited from
the same Texas jail as honest controls for the simulation
study. With a slightly higher percentage of males (58.1%),
the sample’s mean age was 32.14 (SD = 8.45). Regarding
its ethnic composition, the sample was 59.1% European
American with smaller representations of African Ameri-
can (27.3%) and Hispanic American (9.1%).
Competency referrals. As an archival sample (n = 89),
psychologists from four forensic centers in Illinois, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, and North Carolina provided
ECST-R protocols for competency referrals. The sample
was mostly males (85.4%) with a mean age of 35.26 years
(SD = 10.86); ethnically, the sample was composed of Af-
rican Americans (31.5%), European Americans (49.4%),
and Hispanic Americans (13.5%).
Measure
Previous studies included a range of psychological
measures addressing psychopathology (e.g., Schedule of
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia–Change Version
[SADS-C]) (Spitzer & Endicott, 1978), competency to
stand trial, and response styles. A separate investigation
(Rogers, Jackson, Sewell, & Harrison, 2003) examines the
usefulness of the ECST-R Atypical scale as a screen for
feigning. The current study is focused ECST-R compe-
tency scales and their correspondence to the Dusky
standard.
ECST-R. The ECST-R is a semistructured interview de-
signed to assess the Dusky standard and screen for poten-
tial malingering. The ECST-R has three competency
scales that correspond to the Dusky prongs: Consult with
Counsel (CWC), Factual Understanding (FAC), and Ra-
tional Understanding (RAC). These competency scales
were constructed with simple clear inquiries (M = 7.67
words) with concomitant ratings. As noted by Rogers et al.
(2001), the scales demonstrate moderate to excellent alpha
(.72 to .90) and a high level of interrater reliability (.97 to
1.00).
Procedure
All archival data were collected with approval of the
University of North Texas Institutional Review Board.
Data received from outside institutions were completely
de-identified prior to their transfer to the current investiga-
tors. Release of data from North Texas State Hospital was
also approved by Texas Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) Central Office Institu-
tional Review Board. With the exception of archival data,
all participants gave written informed consent prior to
their involvement in the studies.
For purposes of interrater reliability, 15 cases were se-
lected from the competency restoration sample. Reliabil-
ity cases were selected nonsystematically based on the
availability of two independent evaluators. These data
were reported on factor-derived scales corresponding to
the Dusky prongs.
The ECST-R was administered under standard (honest)
instructions for five of the six samples. The sole exception
was the Feigned Incompetency sample, which was given
instructions and a financial incentive to feign incompe-
tency to stand trial. Prior to data analysis, manipulation
checks were used to exclude any participants who did not
follow the instructions or put little to no effort into feign-
ing. The resulting sample (n = 52) is described above.
The order of administration varied across studies and
samples. For competency restoration and competency res-
toration samples, forensic psychologists determined the
order of test administration in relationship to the defen-
dants’specific issues and needs. For the competency cases
sample, the ECST-R was administered first, followed by
the MacCAT-CA. For the mentally disordered offenders
sample, the SADS-C was administered first, followed by
three CST measures (i.e., the ECST-R, GCCT, and
MacCAT-CA) presented in a counterbalanced order and,
finally, the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms
(SIRS) (Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992). For the simula-
(Dunn, Everitt, & Pickles, 1993) and the absolute fit indi-
ces indicated a good fit (i.e., SRMR = .06) or a marginally
good fit (RMSEA = .09).
The two-factor competency models yielded less-than-
adequate fits (see Table 1). Implementation of multivariate
recommendations did not achieve adequate fits for these
models. Problems were mostly observed with the relative-
fit indices. For instance, the RCFI fell short of a good fit for
the domains (.79) and the cognitive-complexity (.86)
models. Among the two-factor models, the domains
model represented a significantly poorer fit than the
cognitive-complexity model (χ2 change[1] = 105.50, p < .01).
The factor loadings and error terms for the discrete-
abilities model were subsequently examined (see Table 2).
Each item loaded significantly on its designated factor. In
general, the magnitude of these loadings was high; the av-
erages for each factor ranged from .67 to .75. In measuring
the closely related dimensions embodied in the Dusky
standard, we expected that factors would be substantially
correlated. We found moderate to moderately high corre-
lations (F1 to F2 = .68; F1 to F3 = .83; F2 to F3 = .75). Given
the magnitude of these intercorrelations, we tested a
global one-factor model that subsumes the three Dusky
prongs. As reported in Table 1, the global model repre-
sented a poor fit for the data based on both relative- and
absolute-fit indices.
The CFA results for the three-factor discrete-abilities
model are important in their own right. For forensic prac-
tice, we also examined whether ECST-R competency
scales derived from the Dusky prongs would evidence
scale homogeneity and reliability. Toward this objective,
we found consistently high alpha coefficients (.83 to .89)
and moderate interitem correlations (see Table 3). Because
average interitem correlations can obscure negligible or
even negative findings, we inspected all interitem correla-
tions. We found no correlations below Clark and Watson’s
(1995) criterion (i.e., rs < .15). In addition, the ECST-R ev-
idenced excellent interrater reliability on both item (M rs
of .89, .97, and .98) and scale (rs of .97, .98, and .98)
levels.
DISCUSSION
A major challenge facing competency measures is
whether the item development sufficiently captures the
relevant functional abilities necessary to assess a specific
standard, such as Dusky (Grisso, 2003). A mismatch be-
tween competency items and the Dusky standard thwarts
any effort to establish construct validation. In this regard,
the ECST-R is the first competency measure to evaluate
formally the representative of its items to Dusky’s specific
prongs. A prototypical analysis with recognized experts
tion study (i.e., feigned-incompetency and jail-detainee 
samples), the administration of measures was the same 
across honest and feigning conditions; that is, the ECST-R 
was administered first, followed by the SADS-C and the 
Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST)
(Miller, 2001).
RESULTS
CST evaluations are conducted in a range of forensic 
and correctional settings with defendants that vary widely 
by clinical condition (e.g., severe Axis I disorders to gen-
erally unimpaired functioning) and by motivation (e.g., 
genuine disorders to blatant malingering). As a rigorous 
test of real-world applications, the three a priori compe-
tency models were assessed with heterogeneous offender 
groups.
The original CFA by Rogers et al. (2001) entered both 
ECST-R items and subitems in testing the model fit. In the 
current evaluation of competency models, our purpose 
was to assess the latent dimensions of Dusky prongs. We 
did not want to capitalize on correlated subitems (e.g., ver-
dicts and sentencing as parts of the judge’s duties) and, 
therefore, limited our analysis to the item level. Impor-
tantly, ECST-R items were scored by the most impairment 
evidenced on any subitem. As a specific example, a defen-
dant may understand some duties of the prosecutor but 
lack the fundamental ability to understand the prosecu-
tor’s role in the adversarial process (e.g., a conviction of 
the defendant). Any composite scoring (e.g., the average 
of subitems) would likely obscure such critical evidence of 
incompetency.
Hu and Bentler (1998, 1999) recommended several 
relative-fit indices—the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and 
Robust Comparative Fit Index (RCFI) with the RCFI 
working especially well with the less-than-optimal distri-
butions of clinical data (Bentler, 1995)—that reject poorly 
specified models. For absolute indices, Hu and Bentler 
recommended the Standardized Root Mean Square Resid-
ual (SRMR) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approxi-
mation (RMSEA).
We tested the three competency models (i.e., discrete 
abilities, domains, and cognitive complexity) with 
maximum-likelihood CFAs (see Table 1). One multi-
variate recommendation was provided for the discrete-
abilities model; Item 12 addressed the potential risks of 
communicating with the prosecutor without the benefit of 
counsel. Clearly, defendants needed to have factual under-
standing of the adversarial process to understand the in-
herent risks. Therefore, we followed the multivariate 
recommendation. The discrete-abilities model achieved a 
moderately good fit; the RCFI met the .90 benchmark
provided a relevant item pool for investigating the under-
lying factor structure of the ECST-R with concomitant im-
plications for our conceptualization of the Dusky standard.
Initial factor analysis (Rogers et al., 2001) of the ECST-R
suggested a two- factor solution that was based on the
cognitive-complexity model. However, this analysis ap-
peared to capitalize on subitem relationships and did not
test an a priori model of Dusky. In contrast, the current
analysis tested the original rationally based model of com-
petency to stand trial and examined deficits at the item
level that are directly germane to the Dusky standard.
Based on the current literature, three competing models
were tested with only the discrete-abilities model achiev-
ing a satisfactory fit.
We found three closely related, yet independent, di-
mensions underlying the ECST-R measurement of the
Dusky standard. Given the moderate to moderately high
intercorrelations among the ECST-R factors, the possibil-
ity of a global one-factor solution could be entertained (see
Table 1). However, this option proved entirely unsuccess-
ful (e.g., relative-fit indices below .80), providing con-
vincing evidence that Dusky is better construed as three
correlated prongs.
A major advantage of the discrete-abilities model is
that it provides forensic psychologists with a useful tem-
plate for conducting competency examinations. These ex-
perts can operationalize and evaluate each Dusky prong
without substantial concerns that a component of compe-
TABLE 1
Testing the Dusky Models with the ECST-R
Models (factors) 2 NFI NNFI CFI RCFI SRMR RMSEA
Discrete abilities (3) 291.82 .87 .88 .89 .90 .06 .09
Domains (2) 456.53 .78 .78 .81 .79 .07 .12
Cognitive complexity (2) 349.88 .83 .84 .86 .86 .06 .10
Global (1) 424.18 .75 .75 .78 .76 .07 .12
NOTE: ECST-R = Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised; χ2 = Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square; NFI = Normed Fit Index; NNFI = Non-
Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RCFI = Robust Comparative Fit Index; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; RMSEA =
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
TABLE 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the ECST-R Three-Factor Discrete-Abilities Model
Factor Loadings
Scales and Items F1: Consult F2: Factual F3: Rational Error
Consult with counsel
1. Psychotic perceptions of attorney .82 .57
2. Irrational expectations of attorney .80 .61
3. Gross misperception of attorney’s goals .60 .80
4. Impaired ability to agree/disagree with attorney .47 .88
5. Impaired ability to resolve conflicts with attorney .67 .75
6. Impaired communications .64 .77
Factual understanding of proceedings
7. Judge’s responsibilities .78 .63
8. Defense attorney’s responsibilities .85 .53
9. Prosecutor’s responsibilities .80 .61
10. Understanding of criminal charges .67 .75
11. Jury’s responsibilities .78 .63
12. Risks of talking with the prosecutor .63 .78
Rational understanding of the proceedings
13. Psychotic decision: talking to prosecutor .86 .51
15. Psychotic decision: testifying .92 .39
17. Psychotic decision: plea bargaining .86 .51
18. Impaired judgment: best/worst outcomes .74 .67
19. Impaired judgment: likely outcome .67 .74
20. Psychotic/strange courtroom experiences .64 .77
21. Unmanageable courtroom behavior .41 .91
Mean factor loadings .67 .75 .73
NOTE: ECST-R = Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial–Revised. Items 14 and 16 had virtually no variance (i.e., < 1.0% with any impairment) and
were not used in the confirmatory factor analyses (CFA).
tency is not sufficiently addressed. Although closely re-
lated (r = .83), the capacity to consult with counsel can be
separated from the broader construct of rational under-
standing. Regarding the latter, the defendant’s capacity to
appreciate his or her circumstances and consider potential
decisions (e.g., testifying or plea bargains) can be assessed
as a discrete dimension. Likewise, factual understanding,
which is often the basis of rational understanding, can also
be assessed separately via the ECST-R.
The CFA results clearly favor the discrete-abilities
model of Dusky that has substantial support among clini-
cal researchers (e.g., Grisso, 2003; Poythress et al., 1999;
Rogers et al., 2001). The ideal would be to test the three
competing models of Dusky across a range of competency
measures. As described in the introduction, however, this
comparative analysis is not feasible. Other competency
measures lack the systematic development of items repre-
sentative of the individual Dusky prongs. Based on the
current analysis, the domains model represented a poor fit
for the data, substantially poorer than the cognitive
complexity model. Despite its methodological limitation,2
the two-factor model of the MacCAT-CA was completely
inconsistent with the domains model (see Rogers et al.,
2001). The current data supplemented by MacCAT-CA
exploratory factor analysis offer no support for the do-
mains model. Legal scholars (e.g., Melton et al., 1997)
may wish to integrate these empirical findings into their
future formulations of the Dusky standard.
In summary, the current study provides solid support
via confirmatory factor analysis of the discrete-abilities
model of Dusky. The ECST-R competency scales, based
on the individual Dusky prongs, have excellent scale ho-
mogeneity with high alphas and each item contributing
positively to the respective scales. Integrating past data on
prototypical analysis by recognized experts with the cur-
rent CFA results on diverse samples provides strong evi-
dence of construct validity. Additional research is needed
to examine further the criterion-related validity of the
ECST-R competency scales in light of independent ex-
perts’ judgments. Beyond the ECST-R competency scales,
research (see, e.g., Rogers, Sewell, Grandjean, & Vitacco,
2002; Rogers et al., 2003) is also under way to investigate
the usefulness of the ECST-R Atypical scale as a screen for
feigned incompetency.
NOTES
1. Technically, the MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool–
Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) scales are referred to as measures;
however, the authors report scale properties, such as alpha coefficients,
interitem correlations, and cut scores.
2. The two-factor model was aligned almost perfectly (20 of 21 sig-
nificant loadings) with two basic types of questions (i.e., hypothetical vs.
case specific).
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